Phil Hellmuth专栏

Poker After Dark Galfond vs. Durrrr

This hand comes from Week 1 of the 2011 version of NBC’s “Poker After Dark.”  The six handed lineup featured some great players, both old school (Huck Seed, John Juanda, Phil Ivey, Erick “Edog” Lindgren) and new school (Tom “Durrrr” Dwan, Phil Galfond), and the format was a $100,000 buy in sit-and-go; winner-take-all.  You can find this exciting hand on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVLwShjnNk0  This is the first time I have included a link to hand in my column, and I view this as a nod to the modern world!
With $600,000 in chips in play Durrrr had amassed $248,000, Phil Ivey was sitting in second place with $134,000 in chips, Galfond had $121,000, and Huck Seed was sitting on $97,000 in chips.  With the blinds at $1,500-$3,000 Durrrr opened under the gun for $7,000 with Ad-5d, Ivey folded on the button, Galfond peered down at A-K and raised it up from the small blind making it $19,500 to go, and Huck Seed found A-Q in the big blind.  At this point a lot of viewers must have been nervous for Seed, but somehow Seed managed to make a good read and fold A-Q to the aggressive youngsters.  Durrrr called $12,500 more, and the flop came down 9h-3s-2s.

With $42,000 in the pot, Galfond bet out $17,000, and Durrrr decided to move all in!  Galfond had $84,500 left, and he decided to call.  With the chip lead on the line ($246,000 in the pot), Durrrr needed a five or a four.  The turn card was a seven and the river was a ten, and Galfond had the chip lead.

Let’s take a closer look at this hand.  Durrrr’s $7,000 min-raise is OK (the new school players like to keep their raises right above or at the min-raise level), and Galfond’s $12,500 reraise into a $17,000 pot is roughly a 75% of the pot reraise, and this is a little above the new school standard of 60% of the pot.  Durrrr’s $12,500 pre-flop call with Ad-5d is fine as he had position on Galfond.  But when you at home decide to make a call like that with A-5 suited, be careful not to blow all of your chips when you hit an ace, or a five.  But also be careful that you don’t fold the best hand either!  What I’m saying is that calling a reraise with A-5 suited is not great spot for an amateur to be in.  Making that call can lead to some very tricky situations on the flop.

I like Galfond’s $17,000 bet into the $42,000 pot on the flop.  Making a C-bet (continuation bet – where you bet on the flop no matter what hits after making the last raise pre-flop) is standard and 40% of the size of the pot is reasonable.  Durrrr’s all in move here was a strong move.  Presumably Durrrr thought that Galfond did not have an over pair and thus he thought that Galfond might fold A-K, or A-Q, or A-J; or that Galfond might have a hand like K-Q.

Galfond’s $84,500 all in call with A-K high was a great one!  With the blinds at $1,500 - $3,000 and $84,500 left in his stack, Galfond could have easily folded his hand and he still would have had 28 big blinds left in his stack: plenty of bullets to come back and win from.  If Durrrr had a pair like 4-4, or 9d-8d, then Galfond’s A-K would have been in bad shape (a clear fold).  So Galfond’s call came down to whether or not he thought that his A-K high was still the best hand.  Galfond thought it was, and he was right!  One factor that made Galfond’s call a little bit easier was that there were a lot of draws possible out there (straight draws and a flush draw were possible on this flop), and he was a favorite over most drawing hands.

Stu Ungar’s Final Hand in 1997 WSOP

Thinking back to Day Two of the main event of the 1997 WSOP (World Series of Poker), I remember that I played at a table that was pretty stacked.  Sitting there on that day were World Champions Doyle “Texas Dolly” Brunson, Bobby Baldwin, Stu Ungar, and me.  I remember that Ungar and I were the chip leaders of the whole tournament, and we dueled all day long!  Unfortunately for me, I was eliminated the next day--on Day Three—with 27 players remaining, but Ungar went on to face John Strzemp for the title and $1 million in cash.

The final table was played outdoors, between the “Horseshoe Casino” and the “Golden Nugget Casino,” with the ESPN cameras there to catch the action.  It is always windy in Las Vegas, and I remember that that was an issue for the dealers.  Here is a link to video of the hand that I am breaking down: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9PjuBWtn3MI  With the blinds at $10,000 - $20,000 and a $2,000 a man ante, Ungar (with over $2 million in chips) opened for $60,000 on the button with A-4, and Strzemp (with less than $1 million in chips) called with A-8.  The flop was A-5-3, Strzemp bet $120,000 into the $124,000 pot, and Ungar studied his cards for a long time (more on this below) before he finally moved all in.  Strzemp called for all of his remaining chips and now Ungar needed to catch a four, or a deuce to win his third World Championship.  The five on the turn meant that Ungar now needed to catch a deuce and only a deuce to win the 1997 WSOP.  The river was a deuce, and Ungar became a three time World Champion of Poker!

Let’s take a closer look at this hand.  Ungar’s $40,000 raise before the flop was a pot sized pre-flop raise and represented the standard for the time.  The new school standard betting sizes are different, and the standard today would have been closer to a $25,000 raise.  Strzemp’s $40,000 pre-flop call was interesting.  In 1997, it was more standard to re-raise with A-8 in a heads up position like this one, and if Strzemp thought that he had the best hand, then he should have reraised it!  The new school standard is to reraise in this spot as well.  Basically, I would teach my students to reraise if they thought that they had the best hand, or if they weren’t sure to reraise anyway (unless they had a strong read).  Because heads up A-8 is a pretty good hand!  Personally, I could have gone either way, depending on the strength of my opponent (How good is he?  Was he making any mistakes?), and my read.  If I thought that I could beat my opponent and I wasn’t sure if his $40,000 was weak or strong, then I would have just called.  If I thought that my opponent had a weaker hand, then I would have moved all in.

Strzemp’s $120,000 pot sized bet on the flop was not a good one.  Since Strzemp was going all the way with this hand on the flop, why bet it?  Why not check-raise the flop, and give Ungar a chance to bluff some chips off?  Or if you have to bet it, then why not bet less and try to appear weak?  After Strzemp bet, Ungar studied for a minute while he appeared to be studying his hole cards.  A few years later, after I saw the hand on tape, I told Ungar, “I know you only looked at the ace before the flop, and that you knew you had a ‘two across’ with it.  Then when the flop came, you knew you had either top two pair, or aces and a straight draw.”  Ungar acted very surprised and said, “How did you know that?” [“Two across” or “Two spotter” means a card that when you look at the spots on half of the underside of the card, there are two.  Thus a two across is a four or a five, a three across is a six, a seven, or an eight, and a four across is a nine or a ten.]  No limit Lowball players “Sweat” in cards all the time looking at how many spots they see on the side, and if, for example, they are even money to have a pair or to make a strong lowball hand (maybe a five pairs them and a four makes them the best possible hand), then they may make a huge bet; not knowing if they have a great hand or if they have squaddush!  After all, it is harder for someone else to read you when you yourself don’t even know if you’re strong or weak!

Ungar’s all in move here was fine.  He either wins the pot if Strzemp is bluffing, wins the pot because Strzemp folds a hand like A-8, or if he does get called by a better ace, then he can always hit a four or a deuce.  Strzemp’s call was a good one.  He correctly surmised that he had the best hand, and actually, when he bet the flop I think that Strzemp felt like he was going to go with it, if necessary.

World Poker Tour A-10 vs. 10-10

The poker tour swung into the Commerce Casino in L. A. in late January for the LAPC (Los Angeles Poker Classic), and on Feb 25th a month of poker climaxed with a $10,000 buy in WPT (World Poker Tour) event.  I have been working hard on my poker game, and going into the WPT event I felt like I was locked into a great strategy.  My tactics were simple: I would play really patient poker, and wait for the cards (and the chips) to come my way.  I wasn’t afraid to fold 9-8 suited, A-J off suit or A-2 suited.  Playing only strong hands lead to some great situations, and Day One was smooth sailing, with nary a scary moment.  Day Two was also smooth, and almost risk free.  I knew then that my new tactics (“Old school Phil” tactics) would work well against almost any field.

On Day Three I stuck to my tactics, but I was ready to make a few moves when the time was right.  Interestingly, the only time I did get into trouble was when I tried to bluff!  Fine, I could easily survive Day Three and make some moves on Day Four, when, hopefully, I was a bit sharper.  With the blinds at $1,000-$2,000 and $120,000 in chips in my stack, an opponent opened for $45,000, and I quickly decided to call in middle position with my Q-Q.  He rolled over K-Q, and the cards fell off: 10-9-3-K-4.  I hated my opponents shove for over 22 big blinds in this deep stack tournament.  However, I do not think it an awful move in an online poker tournament.

With the blinds at $1,200-$2,400, I was sitting on $44,000 in chips when Player A opened for $6,500, and Player B made it $22,000 to go.  I had 10-10 in the small blind and normally I would have folded, but I decided to take a long look at this situation.  First off, Player B was a megalomaniac (super aggressive player) and he had come over the top of Player A a number of times.  Secondly, as I looked at Player B, he gave me the bewildered “I cannot believe he reraised me again” look.  I recognized immediately that this look meant that Player A was weak.  One read down, one read to go.  As I looked on, it was obvious that I had a huge hand, and Played B knew it.  At this point Player B looked afraid.  Player B had been running me over, and I had warned him that I was going to have him crushed when I finally manned up and played a pot with him.  Finally, I decided that Player B probably had at best 9-9, 8-8, or A-J.  Thus, for the first time in three days I decided to go with a hand; now what?

I could call, and then move all in on any flop that hit, no matter what it was.  I could move all in, and of course, I knew that Player B would call with any two cards getting laid three-and-a-half-to-one ($76,000 to $22,000).  If Player B had 9-9, 8-8, a small pair, 9-8 suited or something like that, then why not get all of my chips into the pot before the flop?  If he had A-J, then why not look at a flop, and then move all in (unless I flopped a set)?  I felt like it was a close decision, but the fact that this player was so aggressive and could have anything tilted my decision to moving all in.

Finally, I settled for all in, and Player B called and showed down A-10 off suit.  It just so happened that the WPT cameras were there along with all the media in the room as Player B told me, “Bye bye Phil, an ace is coming.” Whatever!  The flop was safe, J-5-5, but then an ace popped off!  Playing the results, I guess I should have called pre-flop, and moved all in on the flop…

Deep, Deep Stack Poker!

The poker tour swung into the Commerce Casino in L. A. in late January for the LAPC (Los Angeles Poker Classic), and on Feb 25th a month of poker climaxed with a $10,000 buy in WPT (World Poker Tour) event.  Last column I talked about the hand that I was eliminated on during Day Three (my 10-10 vs A-10) of the LAPC WPT, and this column I will take a look at a hand that I won early on Day One.  By the way, my tactics for Day One were simple: I would play really patient poker, and wait for the cards (and the chips) to come my way.  I wasn’t afraid to fold 9-8 suited, A-J off suit or A-2 suited.  Playing only strong hands can lead to some great situations.  Yes my friends, after a lot of studying, I have come all the way back to the super tight “Old school Phil” tactics!

With the blinds at $100-$200, I opened under the gun with 3-3 for $600.  At this point I had roughly my starting stack of $30,000.  The player on the button, and the player in the big blind called, and the flop came down 7h-4s-3d.  The player in the big blind checked, I checked, and the player on the button checked.  The turn card was the king of spades.  The player in the big blind checked, I bet $1,300, the player on the button folded, and the player in the big blind raised it up to $4,200 to go.  I studied for a moment, and then decided to just call.  The river was the four of clubs (7-4-3-K-4) and now the player in the big blind bet $11,400.  I snap called, the player in the big blind flipped up 6-5 for a straight, and I collected a nice pot with my full house.

Let’s take a closer look at this hand.  I like my check on the flop, because I was playing defensive poker with my 150 big blind chip stack.  A few years back at the LAPC WPT, I called a raise with 4-4, and in a heads up pot the flop came down Js-7d-4s, and I went broke to three sevens.  After I flew home I was upset at myself for not saving some chips.  I mean, who knows what might have happened had I saved $10,000 in that hand?  Another positive for my check on the 7-4-3 board was that is allows my opponents, who are presumably drawing dead a lot of times on this flop, to hit a pair with a hand like A-J, and a turn card of say, a jack; whereupon they would lose some chips to me drawing dead.  The check also allows me to catch someone who is bluffing.  On the downside, the check keeps the pot smaller when my opponent has a pair of sevens (like 8-7), and the check allows an opponent to hit a six or a five and potentially make a straight and beat me.

On the turn, I like my opponents check with a made straight.  Since his two opponents may have been drawing dead, why not check again?  Also, if either of us hit a king, then he could check raise and maybe have us pay him off some serious chips with just one pair of kings.  I just called the check raise because I didn’t want to move all in and have my opponent show me higher trips, or a straight.  Again, why bust myself?

On the river, I like my opponents $11,400 bet.  I mean, in his mind he was just trying to pick a number that I could pay off!  I wouldn’t mind seeing him bet a little less though, like say, $6,000 or $7,000, as it would be easier for me to pay that bet off with a hand like K-Q.  I could only call the river because I had to protect my chips!  Also, what hand could my opponent call my all in move with, that I could beat?

Busted By the Bay!

The WPT (World Poker Tour) rolled into the Bay Area in the middle of March.  Last year I made the final table of the Bay 101 event, only to fall short of my ultimate goal of winning the whole enchilada when I finished in sixth place.  My Q-Q fell to my opponents A-J when an ace hit on the last card; and although I managed to shake everyone’s hand afterwards and smile, after I walked off stage I collapsed in a heap.  Five days of great poker playing went down the tubes in an instant!  Well, at least my collapse made for good television…

The Bay 101 WPT event is unique in that there are bounties on the poker stars.  The buy in is $10,000, and if you knock out a “Shooting star” you collect a $5,000 bounty.  The bounty changes the way people play hands, as well it should.  On Day Two I came in with $20,000 (starting stack was $30,000) and a head full of steam.  With the blinds at $600 - $1,200, I called $2,600 on the button with Kh-Jh, and both the blinds (no doubt eyeing up a potential bounty) called as well.  The flop was 10h-8s-7h, and all three players checked to me.  Sitting with a straight draw, a flush draw, and two over cards, I was supposed to move all in for my last $13,800, but I had a bad feeling that someone was super strong, so I checked.  The turn was the Qh, both blinds checked, the original raiser bet $5,000, and I decided to smooth call with my king high flush, thinking that there was a good chance that everyone else was drawing dead.  To my great disappointment, both blinds folded.  The river was the 5c, my opponent bet my last $8,800, and I snap called!  He showed a set of eights [nice check on the flop Phil!], and I collected a nice pot.  The very next hand I picked up A-J and reraised an opponent and won the pot.

One round later I peered down at A-K and opened for $2,700.  Vivek Rajkumar, sitting right behind me, made it $7,200 to go.  Everyone folded and I shoved all in for $37,700 more ($44,900 total).  After a few seconds I was rooting for a call, because I thought that Rajkumar would have called with a medium pair fairly quickly.  Rajkumar joked, “I need a calculator to figure out the ‘Bounty math.’”  Finally, Rajkumar called and flipped over A-10.  Yes, I was two-and-a-half-to-one favorite to have over $93,000!  The board ran out 10-5-2-4, and Rajkumar—who is a good guy--had the nerve to exclaim, “Don’t do it to me!  No king!”  [Don’t do it to you?  Really?]  The river was a four, and that was it for me.

Let’s take a closer look at this hand: I like my $2,700 opening raise, although in general I have been opening for 3x the big blind (3 x $1,200 = $3,600).  Rajkumar’s reraise is OK, at least it is aggressive.  I love my shove!  I’m saying, “Give me that $18,000 in the pot right now!”  I do not like Rajkumar’s call.  When you consider that Rajkumar was calling off 80% of his chips, then I hate the call!  $37,700 more when you have $7,200 in the pot, against a tight player that will have you dominated 90% of the time?  Yuck!  Yes, I am a bounty, and when Huck Seed and I discussed this hand, Seed felt like Rajkumar’s call was “A bad call, but not by much.”  Mike “The Mouth” Matusow said, “I hate his call.  He was playing Day Two of a $10,000 buy in poker tournament and he puts 80% of his chips into the pot in that spot?!?”

Wynn This!

On the opening weekend of the NCAA basketball tournament I spent the weekend in Las Vegas watching games, and on Monday I played in the four daylong $5,000 buy in main event at the “Wynn Casino.”  The structure was great!  We started with $30,000 in chips and there was tons of time to move your chips.  On Day Three the following hand came up.

With the blinds at $2,500-$5,000, Dutch Boyd opened his third pot in a row in early position, making it $12,000 to go.  In middle position I looked down at K-K and I had a bad feeling.  I decided to smooth call, and the player in the big blind called as well.  The flop was 5d-3d-2s, both players checked to me, and I checked.  On the turn the seven of spades came off, and the player in the big blind fired out $19,000.  Dutch called, and I called.  The river was the jack of clubs, and the player in the big blind bet out $33,000.  Dutch and I both called, and the player in the big blind flipped up J-J to claim the pot with trip jacks!  Dutch flipped up Q-Q, and I was feeling a little sick to my stomach as I flipped up K-K!  Was I unlucky in this hand?  Yes, but…

Let’s take a closer look at this hand.  Dutch’s raise was pretty standard.  My call is OK.  I mean, ideally I would like to reraise with K-K about 70% of the time, especially if I am occasionally three betting it weak (reraising with bluffing hands).  If I am never three betting my opponents, then a three bet looks really strong, and I would argue that this is the 30% of the time that I should smooth call with K-K.  I mean why announce the strength of my hand?  The fact that Dutch opened his third pot in a row suggests some weakness, and thus it could be argued that this was a good time to smooth call with K-K.  I like the third player’s smooth call with J-J in the big blind.  First, he was out of position.  Second, if he read one or both of us for being really strong, then a smooth call was a terrific move.  To be fair, if he read us as being weak, then I would like to see him three bet it with J-J and try to win the pot right then and there.  I like the big blinds check on the flop, and Dutch’s check was OK with me as well as he was attempting to trap us and keep the pot size small (in case one of us had like Ad-Jd), although it is also a good spot to bet with Q-Q.  I mean, these days everyone expects a continuation bet (the original raiser to bet on the flop), so that a bet here in this spot would be standard and would not reveal the strength of the pocket queens.  Thus, why not make that continuation bet with your hugely strong pocket queens?  I do not like my check on the flop although the check does keep the pot size down (and it keep me in the tournament) if my opponent had say, Ad-Jd, trips, or pocket aces.  Still, there is a time to play it safe, and there is a time to go for it!  And pocket kings--on a 5d-3d-2s flop—is go time.  I should have bet something like 60% of the pot, or maybe even more.  On the turn, the player in the big blinds $19,000 bet was ok, and Dutch’s smooth call seems ok, although I would like to see Dutch raise it up to maybe, say, $75,000.  I hate my smooth call again.  The reason I smooth called here was to keep myself alive in the poker tournament--I still had $120,000 left behind after the smooth call.  A better play would have been to raise it up to $80,000 or so, or maybe just move all in.  On the river, I like the player in the big blinds $33,000 bet.  His bet sizing kept both Dutch and I in there to pay off his hand.  Had he bet a lot more, than maybe one or both of us could have folded our hands.

Unlucky?  Maybe, but this hand was set up for me to win it, had I simply played it the right way (more aggressively).  A reraise pre-flop allows me to win the pot and get rid of the player with the J-J, and maybe Dutch loses $150,000 to me.  If I bet big on the flop (5-3-2), then I could have moved all in on the turn (5-3-2-7) and I am over 80% sure that the J-J would have folded.  Alas, instead I finished 19th (22 were paid), but I am ready to win a few big tournaments right now.  I am on top of my game, strong as I can be, and I am ready and willing to win big!

West Coast Bust Out

After making Day Three in the Wynn Poker Classic Championship event, I wanted to play in more poker tournaments!  I played three solid days of poker at the Wynn only to finish in nineteenth place, when 22 were paid; I wasn’t happy with my finish, but at least I made the money.  So when the WSOP (World Series of Poker) and ESPN asked me to fly to Harrahs-Rincon Casino in the San Diego area the next day to interview Dale Earnhardt Jr, I took a look at the WSOP Circuit event schedule and discovered that the main event began Sunday.  So I hopped right on in!

On Day Two I found myself sitting to the left of Tim West.  West is well liked by the poker community and he had just won the Wynn Classic on Thursday, and I respect the way he plays in no limit Hold’em tournaments.  After about 20 minutes West raised it up in early position, and I reraised it with like 8-3 off suit.  West was raising a lot of pots and I sensed that he was weak; I was right, and West folded.  About 30 minutes later, West raised it up in early position, and I looked down at A-K.  With the blinds at $300-$600, and a $50 ante, West opened for $1,600.  I didn’t have a read one way or the other, so I made it $4,500 to go.  West then moved all in—West had $130,000—for my last $19,000.  I looked at West and I felt some serious strength emanating from him.  Then I asked myself, “Does Tim have pocket aces?”  I felt like he did not have pocket aces.  So now what?  A-K is a tough hand to get away from for 36 big blinds, but I did feel strength.  If West had K-K, then I was in tough shape.  But if West had Q-Q, J-J, or A-K, then a call here was warranted.  West and I had been actually talking on the phone quite a bit in the days leading up to the event, so I felt like he was playing his hand straight up, which meant that he was super strong, which meant that I should fold.  Back and forth I went between calling all in and folding before I thought, “I feel strongly that Tim doesn’t have pocket aces, so put the chips into the middle!”  I called, and West flipped up pocket kings, doh!  The cards came off K-10-7-10-J, bye bye Phil!

West had this to say about the hand, “I felt like my best play was to move all in, or to smooth call your $2,900 reraise.  I really didn’t want to reraise any other amount as I felt like you would fold your hand.”  The good news for me is that I thought that there was a great chance that West had K-K.  Next time I fly somewhere to play in a poker tournament, I really need to completely trust my instincts!  Congrats to Tim West for finishing in second place; a first at Wynn, a second in San Diego, what a week!!

The Mouth Attempts A Big Bluff

A few months ago I watched the final table of the WPT (World Poker Tour) tournament at the Bay 101 as Mike “The Mouth” Matusow went for the win.  Late in the day, with four players remaining at the table and the blinds at $15,000 - $30,000—and a $5,000 a man ante—Matusow ($1.8 million in chips) opened for $70,000 under the gun with Ac-10d, and Alan Sternberg ($3.7 million in chips) called with 4-4 on the button.  The flop came down Ks-9h-9c, Matusow bet $85,000, and Sternberg called.  The turn card was the 6c, Matusow checked, and Sternberg bet $125,000.  After a minute, Matusow made a move and raised it up to $325,000 to go (a $200,000 raise), and after about 30 seconds Sternberg called.  The river was the 3h, and Matusow bet $500,000, and Sternberg quickly called.

I break this hand down, both here in this column below and in full video on the WPT website.  Before I begin, I need to give some context to the hand.  Matusow had not made a single bluff for hours, and he was clearly the tightest player at the table.  Matusow’s opening raise of $70,000 (a little bit over a 2x raise of $60,000) is the standard sized raise of 2011.  It doesn’t mean that I like it!  I would rather see a bigger sized raise of say, three times the big blind ($90,000).  Sternberg’s call was fine.  Matusow’s $85,000 c-bet (continuation bet - where the player that raises it up before the flop bets on the flop) was OK by me, and is standard.  Matusow’s check on the turn was OK; it looks like A-10 is not the best hand, so why not give up losing $155,000?  Sternberg’s $125,000 bet is interesting.  Obviously Sternberg thought that he had the best hand with his pocket fours.  Thus he thought that Matusow was weak, and because of this fact, I like Sternberg’s $125,000 bet.  Another two points that back up Sternberg’s bet: first, by betting here, he freezes Matusow from making a bigger sized bet on the river if Matusow has a pocket pair higher than Sternberg’s, like J-J; second, he protects his hand from losing by forcing Matusow to fold hands like A-Q.  On the other side of the coin, by betting here Sternberg could put himself into a tough spot, because if Matusow does raise it up, then Sternberg probably has to fold as he can only beat a bluff, and Matusow hadn’t bluffed all day long.  So Sternberg’s bet allows Matusow to make a move, or to charge Sternberg more money if Matusow does have him beat and raises it up.  I like Matusow’s $200,000 raise on the turn, but I would have liked it if he had raised it up more, like say $400,000 or so.

I love Matusow’s $500,000 bluff on the river for four reasons: first, Matusow had a good read (Matusow told me that he thought that Sternberg had a small pocket pair): second, Matusow had not attempted a bluff in five hours of play, so that he had a strong image: third, Matusow bet the right amount, in other words he bet like he had A-K: fourth, Matusow’s $500,000 river bet showed a ton of heart and courage—I mean Matusow fired three barrels (he bluffed three straight streets), and this is a rare feat!  Two facts worked against Matusow: first, the fact that Sternberg had already called $325,000 on the turn made it more likely that he would call a $500,000 bet on the river: second, Sternberg had a lot more chips than Matusow did, so that a $500,000 call wouldn’t put too big a dent in his stack.  Give Sternberg maximum credit here for a great read: Sternberg called a three barrel bluff with a small pair!  To sum up, Matusow’s strong bet was trumped by Sternberg’s strong read.